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BLACK SOLDIERS
AT FORT HAYS, KANSAS, 1867 .. 1869
A STUDY IN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY VIOLENCE

JAMES N. LEIKER

opening the West for white settlement. Despite
their important functions, uniformed African
Americans continually suffered racism and discrimination from frontier civilians and even
from some of their own white officers. l
For much of this century, both popular culture and professional historians overlooked the
buffalo soldiers. The gallant stereotype of patriotic, blue-jacketed warriors bringing civilization to the plains failed to accommodate the
presence of armed blacks. Although scholars
began to draw public attention toward black
soldiers as early as the 1960s, the dedication of
a buffalo soldiers monument at Fort
Leavenworth in 1992 fully captured the popular imagination, partly because of Colin
Powell's visible involvement. The Leavenworth project was accompanied by a veritable
explosion of buffalo soldiers commemorations
including museum displays, documentaries,
newspaper and journal articles, and reenactment societies. Where once the public imagined the West only in terms of white soldiers
and red Indians, the present fascination represents a positive step in defining the region as a
meeting ground for numerous races and cultures, a step that scholars should applaud.

Historians of the western army contend with
many romanticized myths. Few of those myths,
in recent years, have held the popular consciousness as has that of the army's first black
regulars, known as "buffalo soldiers." By now,
the origins of the segregated regiments are
quite familiar. In 1866, with the nation's acting military force having dwindled ro a fraction of its Civil War size, the Republican
Congress encouraged the enlistment of newly
freed slaves and northern free blacks. Assigned
to remote western areas, black units played an
instrumental role over the next few decades in
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Yet not all have been enthusiastic about
proclaiming buffalo soldiers' contributions to
western conquest. From a Native American
standpoint, lionizing the black regiments to
redress historical neglect appears no more just
nor progressive than the Anglo myths that excluded them. When the U.S. Postmaster General announced a commemorative buffalo
soldiers stamp in 1994, representatives of the
American Indian Movement demanded both
the stamp's withdrawal and a public apology.2
For all the topic's recent attention, few grasp
its frustrating irony: that black males, themselves victims of white prejudice, voluntarily
aided the subjugation of Native peoples for
the benefit of Anglo expansion. This scenario
illustrates the complicated, even paradoxical,
nature of American race relations. Unfortunately, significant questions are overshadowed
by the topic's "contribution" aspects, helping
to provide a focus for national and racial pride,
a cry of "we were there too." Nor have academic historians pursued the more difficult
questions as aggressively as they should. New
Western History, which has debunked many
myths surrounding white occupation and
shown its catastrophic consequences for minorities, generally ignores the army's role in
western conquest. Military histories have added
tremendously to knowledge about the subject
but most employ traditional approaches that
are more event-centered and descriptive than
analytical and interpretive.
The time appears right for a serious reappraisal of the army's first black regulars, one
that resists the temptation to cast them either
as villainous enforcers of white oppression or
heroic subjects of injustice. The former depiction rests on the questionable assumption that
blacks shared whites' racist attitudes toward
Indians; the latter, more common view treats
them as passive victims, stoically enduring discrimination. Both rob the buffalo soldiers of
conscious agency, seeing them not as historical actors but merely as "acted upon." In fact,
when uniformed blacks entered the hostile racial climate of western towns, some acquiesced
to white racism but others violently resisted.

Although holding limited options, buffalo soldiers' individual reactions to civilian antagonism played a vital role in local race relations.
SETTING THE SCENE

Fort Hays, located in northwest Kansas,
serves as an example of black agency. Active
from 1865 to 1889, its garrison protected stagecoach and railway traffic along the Smoky Hill
River to Denver.3 Stationed there in the late
1860s, troops from the Thirty-eighth Infantry
and Tenth Cavalry (both consisting entirely
of black soldiers) comprised the majority of
the post's enlisted men up to 1869. Though
engaged in several Indian battles, the average
black soldier had more reason to fear civilians
or even comrades than Indians; more injuries
and killings resulted from altercations in camp
or nearby Hays City than from combat. While
Fort Hays's troubles were not unique, the unusual mingling of a predominantly black military with growing numbers of white civilians
led to racial violence that mirrored and even
surpassed that in other western communities. 4
Given Kansas' early reputation among African Americans as a safe haven for freedmen,
such an assertion might seem surprising. After
all, Kansas had been among the first states to
muster black volunteers into Union service. s
Even after the Civil War, images of "Bleeding
Kansas" and John Brown enhanced the state's
prestige among southern blacks as a place of
opportunity and freedom. In the late 1870s,
thousands of "exodusters"-emigrants fleeing
the South after Reconstruction-chose Kansas
as their destination. While most exodusters
found only disillusionment in the so-called
"Canaan of the Prairies," active state charity
organizations worked diligently to ease the refugees' plight. 6 In addition, Kansas claimed several black communities, among them
Nicodemus, established in 1877 only fifty miles
northwest of Hays City. If any state could have
been expected to tolerate a high population
of black soldiers, it should have been Kansas.
While the legacies of abolition and the
Civil War may have encouraged relative open-

BLACK SOLDIERS AT FORT HAYS, KANSAS

5

FIG. 1. Main street, Hays City, Kansas, 1871 . Courtesy of Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka,
Kansas.

ness in the state's eastern communities, however, isolated locales like Fort Hays initially
shared little with Lawrence and Leavenworth.
During the black units' peak enlistment in the
late 1860s, the new forts and towns truly epitomized the "frontier," the peripheral edge of
white settlement socially and geographically.
While "frontier" as an analytical concept has
been criticized for its ethnocentric connotations, the term retains usefulness for discovering how racial hatreds were transferred to the
developing region. 7 By examining how the civilian community perceived and interacted
with black soldiers, we can draw a clearer picture of how the black military experience
helped to shape western race relations.

Understanding the reception of black soldiers in Hays City first necessitates an examination of the military and social atmosphere at
Fort Hays. As Indian raids diminished by late
1867, three Tenth Cavalry companies were
recalled for winter rest at Fort Riley, leaving
Fort Hays largely under the protection of black
infantry.s Because of its central location and
proximity to the railroad, Fort Hays served as
General Philip Sheridan's administrative headquarters and a depot for goods arriving by rail
during the 1868-69 campaign. Although small
cavalry detachments remained until 1871, infantry comprised the garrison's majority. Thus,
if Fort Hays could claim a "semi-permanent"
black population up to 1869, the Thirty-eighth

6

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1997

FIG. 2. Buffalo soldiers at Fort Hays guarding a U.S . express overland stage coach preparing to depart for
Denver. Courtesy of Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas.

Infantry fit that role better than the more transient Tenth Cavalry.
Narratives often focus on the cavalry's dramatic offensive campaigns and overlook infantrymen, who performed the more routine
tasks of escorting surveying parties, military
prisoners, and payroll and supply shipments.
Infantry also received a disproportionate share
of kitchen and hospital duties and sanitation
detail. Although their activities attracted less
attention, they nonetheless performed hazardous tasks in isolated groups of four or five that
were vulnerable to surprise attacks. Troopers
knew full well the perils of their work. Complaints reached the fort commander in July
1868 about five soldiers from the Thirty-eighth
assigned to protect railroad water tanks. Housed
in small shelters with ten-day rations, the troops

fired indiscriminately at anyone-white, black,
or Indian-who ventured too close. Lest the
frightened infantrymen fire on peaceful Native people and provoke conflict, officers ordered them to deal cautiously with anyone who
approached rather than resorting to gunfire. 9
Black soldiers often are depicted as victims,
thereby emphasizing the army's racial prejudice. Indeed, discrimination did occur; troops
frequently suffered abuse by bigoted officers
and received harsher punishments than white
soldiers for disciplinary offenses. The prohibition against blacks' serving as officers even in
their own regiments indicates the army's low
initial regard for their abilities. IO Yet deplorable conditions awaited all of the western
army's enlisted men, no matter their color.
None would have asserted "equality" as a goal;
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the military, after all, constituted a system of
institutionalized inequality. But that did not
negate the possibility of fair treatment from
officers who interacted with the men on a daily
basis. In fact, at Fort Hays, white commanders
often became their troops' greatest partisans,
even protecting them from hostile civilians. In
a macabre way, blacks and whites stationed
there achieved a certain degree of equality:
both lived abominably.
Fort Hays differed little from most outposts
during its first few months, consisting merely
of several tents and crude huts. Its isolated
location limited the range of leisure activities-not that much leisure time was available. Poor hygiene and sanitation rendered
soldiers vulnerable to disease. Beginning in
July 1867, a devastating cholera epidemic
swept the western forts, striking the black units
especially hard. Cholera killed seven men of
the Thirty-eighth Infantry that summer but the
Tenth Cavalry lost more than twenty men, more
than half the regiment's total number of combat deaths up to 1918. 11 Conditions gradually improved after the Union Pacific Railroad
reached Hays in October 1867, particularly
because it brought fresh supplies and materials for building permanent structures. Yet poor
health continued to sap the garrison's strength.
Despite their dangerous duties, soldiers obtained medical treatment more frequently for
pneumonia and other ailments than for combat injuries. Gastrointestinal illnesses were especially common; nearly a third of the post's
black soldiers received treatment for diarrhea. 12
Health officials knew that improved hygiene and fresh food would decrease these problems yet found implementing such simple
improvements difficult. Quartermasters unsuccessfully tried to provide unspoiled meat,
while either insects or neglect doomed the
post's paltry attempt at growing its own vegetables. \3 Most enlisted men, regardless of
color, cared little for personal cleanliness.
Assistant surgeon William Buchannon complained that Tenth cavalrymen stacked all
their dirty clothes and muddy stable equipment under the bunks, attracting flies to an
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already crowded and improperly ventilated
barracks. 14
Constant guard and escort duty, as well as
the transient nature of army life, makes such
apathy seem understandable. Similarly, Fort
Hays' hectic work load left enlisted men little
time or inclination to attend the post school
that taught reading and writing, addition and
subtraction. What leisure time existed was
spent enjoying the benefits of steady pay. Earnings ranged from thirteen dollars a month for
new privates to thirty dollars for noncommissioned officers. Although some men sent money
to families back east, most wages purchased
necessities from the post sutler's store or from
local civilian merchants. A considerable
amount ended up in the town's many taverns
and brothels.
Drunkenness affected all troops at Fort Hays,
including buffalo soldiers. Post records include
many accounts of privates charged with neglecting duty or engaging in disorderly conduct while under the influence of alcohol.
Perhaps because their isolated work made it
easier and more tempting to sneak a drink, the
Thirty-eighth Infantry seemed particularly
prone to such problems. In February 1868 the
commander placed pickets to arrest all personnel who were intoxicated, created a disturbance, or lacked passes signed by a superior
officer. Typical punishment for drink-related
offenses involved a fine, brief incarceration,
or a reduction in rank. 15
Why the high frequency of alcohol use? The
combination of disease, separation from family, fear of Indian attack, and generalloneliness likely inspired many to seek solace from a
bottle. Frontier racism made intoxication particularly dangerous for black soldiers. Since
the white public perceived the black units as
experimental at best, charges of drunkenness
and immorality could easily taint black regiments' reputations. At Fort Hays, the picket
guard decreased alcohol-related offenses but
did not necessarily increase sobriety. When
getting drunk on the fort became too risky, soldiers waited until payday and visited taverns
in Hays City. This proved dangerous for the
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black soldier since he was subject to civilian
law, not military, and white locals had extremely little patience with unruly armed
blacks.
The violent atmosphere and miserable, disease-ridden conditions encouraged many desertions from the frontier military. In 1867 more
than 14,000 men deserted the United States
Army, nearly a quarter of its total strength. 16
Most deserters disappeared successfully into
civilian populations; the military simply
lacked the time and manpower to pursue runaways. Cavalrymen especially were likely to
make clean breaks since they took their horses
and all the army property they could carry,
including food, mules, wagons, and firearms.
Elizabeth Custer described how forty men deserted Fort Hays in one night, leaving officers
fearful that the garrison would soon lack sufficient protection. 17
Romanticized works on buffalo soldiers
point proudly to their low desertion rates, a
claim partly supported by statistics from Fort
Hays. While more than half of the Seventh
Cavalry deserted in only one year, a mere fourteen deserters were reported from Fort Hays'
black regiments during its first five years. IS Although drunkenness and insubordination were
common among all enlisted men, desertion
appeared primarily to be a white phenomenon.
The dearth of black western settlers, and black
soldiers' distinctive appearance, made it difficult for potential deserters to blend into
nearby communities. One should not, however,
discount the more idealistic explanation that
blacks' group identity and pride discouraged
desertion. Despite its pitfalls, military service
offered African American males opportunities
for self-respect seldom matched in Reconstruction America.
Desertion rates remained high throughout
the post-Civil War period but peaked in
1871. 19 By then Indian resistance in the Hays
vicinity had nearly disappeared, even though
the fort remained a valuable transportation
depot and winter quarters. As white settlement
increased, a reciprocal relationship developed

between the post and nearby Hays City. Town
merchants provided needed goods and services
while the army employed civilian laborers on
construction projects. Likewise, the thousands
of dollars of army pay spent in Hays City fertilized a prosperous local economy.
Beneath this symbiosis lay major currents
of hostility. Hays City resembled other western communities where violence between soldiers and civilians contributed to the region's
reputation for bloodshed. If Civil War veterans were praised as heroes, federal regulars,
often immigrants and displaced industrial
workers, were often seen as rabble. 20 The proliferation of saloons and brothels that sprang
up around every military post offended new
settlers' puritanical values. 21 In addition, many
westerners dismissed the federal regulars as
ineffective Indian fighters, even resenting their
presence. One Kansan, explaining why the
state militia could deal with local hostilities
more effectively, ridiculed the army's ceaseless bugling, alerting enemies as soldiers prepared to attack, retreat, awake, or go to bed. 22
Uniformed soldiers frequently elicited jokes
or insults from civilians, not respect. In the
case of a uniformed freedman, reactions could
be openly hostile, especially among former
Confederates for whom buffalo soldiers provided a visible reminder of southern defeat.
These charged emotions played out in the
chaos of western communities during early
years of development. Although scholarship
on Kansas cattle towns emphasizes the exaggeration of violence in popular myth, Hays
City, established in October 1867 as a Union
Pacific terminus, lay beyond most major cattle
trails, and its violence came not from rowdy
Texas cattle drovers but from transients looking for profits from the railroad. 23 An eastern
Kansas newspaper described Hays' citizenry in
unflattering terms:
Gamblers, pimps, prostitutes, and dead
beats, run the town, and the most unblushing defiance of everything that is decent is
the prevailing sentiment. One year ago, for
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the joke of the thing, they elected a prostitute as one of the School Board, and another Street Commissioner. How it is to be
expected black or white soldiers will act
any other way when they get a taste of the
lightning poison vended there is a mystery
to us. We hope the authorities of the State
will incur no expense in protecting any such
a class as runs Hays City.24
Observers did not exaggerate the town's horrific level of violence; from 1867 to 1874,
Hays City saw more than thirty recorded homicides. 25 During periods of ineffective civilian
law enforcement, black troops served as the
town guard. In late 1867, a visitor recorded
that:
Hays City is really under martial law, the
town being policed by soldiers from the fort;
and, what makes it trebly obnoxious to some,
the soldiers are colored. They certainly have
the credit, however, of maintaining quiet
and general good order throughout the day
and night: that is, quiet for a frontier town. 26
Actually, the presence of federal regulars exacerbated more violence than it prevented.
Nearly half of all homicides up to 1874, thirteen, resulted from altercations between soldiers and civiliansY
Considering the color of the troops involved, a problem arises in trying to separate
"racial" violence from the larger pattern of civilian-military violence everywhere, regardless
of race. Simply because an episode involved a
black participant did not mean it had racial
causes. The key distinction rests on whether an
incident originated from some discriminatory
behavior based on skin color. By that criteria,
not all violence involving blacks duri:ng Hays
City's first three years can be classified as "racial." But the Fort Hays experience certainly
shows a hardening of white opinions toward
armed African Americans, reflected not only
in the callous actions of local toughs but in
how state newspapers reported such activity.
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Black soldiers did not behave like passive
victims of prejudice. The same group cohesion that discouraged black desertions encouraged a search for vengeance when a soldier
was wronged or insulted. White troops shared
the feud mentality that characterized fort-town
relations; if an individual returned to the post
bruised or bloodied, comrades shielded him
from discovery until they could get revenge
on his assailants. 28 For buffalo soldiers, however, the drive to retaliate appeared especially
strong. During a national age of violent racism, the army's black frontiersmen upheld the
doctrine of "eye for an eye." Their refusal to
tolerate abuse certainly deserves a measure of
admiration, but their actions ultimately intensified white prejudice, creating a cycle of
hatred that resembled an ongoing blood feud.
THE FIRST VIOLENT ENCOUNTER

The first violent encounter, initiated by
townspeople, illustrates how officers generally
sided with their men. Prior to the picket
guard's establishment in February 1868, post
commanders had to deal with the habitual
problem of troops leaving the fort without permission. On 21 December 1867, a small detail was sent to retrieve all those absent
without leave, most of whom were imbibing
in civilian saloons. Privates Charles Allen,
Thirty-eighth Company E, and John Washington, Tenth Cavalry Company I, demanded
admittance to an establishment where AWOL
soldiers reportedly languished. When they
were refused, Allen began beating the door
with his weapon. The saloonkeeper, Matthew
"Red" Flinn, fired several shots, killing Allen
and severely wounding Washington. The
town guard, Allen's fellow infantrymen, immediately began searching for Flinn. Later
the same evening a local named Cornelius
Doyle accosted Corporal Albert E. Cropper,
Thirty-eighth Company G, cursing him and
shouting that "any damned nigger soldiers
hunting Red" would be killed. The argument
ended when Doyle apparently attempted to
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FIG. 3. Passersby view the bodies of Private George Sumner and Private Peter Welsh the morning after they had
been killed in Hays City by their comrade Private David Roberts, 6 September 1873. All were from the white Sixth
Cavalry. The bodies were removed by an ambulance from the fort and Roberts was convicted of manslaughter. The
viewers seem inured to the violent climate. Courtesy of Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas.

draw his pistol and Cropper fatally shot him
with his rifle. 29
While Allen's death produced no great uproar, talk immediately filled the streets about
lynching Cropper. Civilian newspapers described Doyle's shooting far differently than
the official military report. The Hays City Railway Advance claimed Doyle gave Cropper no
"provocation whatever," a charge repeated by
a Hays resident in a hearsay letter to the
Lawrence Tribune. 30 Following his arrest and
preliminary hearing, Cropper was transferred
to the post guardhouse for his own protection.
Meanwhile, fort commander Captain Samuel
Ovenshine had arranged with county authorities to offer a reward for Red Flinn, who had

left the county and later was located near
Leavenworth. 31
Whether Cropper really acted in self-defense cannot decisively be determined from
the disparate accounts, even though his record
shows no history of similar trouble. 32 Yet the
fact that disparate accounts exist at all reveals
how differently the civilian and military communities perceived the incident. Already suspicious of the patrol guard, residents now
thought the army had protected a murderer.
To prevent further hostility, Ovenshine withdrew the patrol and returned Hays City to the
jurisdiction of civil law, the inefficiency of
which only contributed to Cropper's eventual
acquittal. By the time the District Court re-
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convened after a six-month hiatus, only one
witness to Doyle's shooting remained in the
county, and Cropper's case was dismissed for
lack of suitable jurors. 33
The killings of Allen and Doyle commenced years of hostility between the fort and
town. While Cropper awaited trial, minor conflicts between black soldiers and white
townsfolk continued through 1868, the same
year Hays City came under control of an organized vigilante group. The vigilance committee visited perceived troublemakers and
ordered them to leave town. Despite their
stated purpose of establishing peace, vigilantes only increased local violence; thirteen
documented murders occurred in 1869, the
town's peak year for homicides. 34 While most
eastetn Kansas newspapers denounced the situation, at least one, the Lawrence Tribune, partly
defended vigilante activity by declaring that
lax law enforcement required citizens to protect themselves. In recalling the army's protection of the "murderer" Cropper, the writer
implied the committee's real purpose was to
defend the community from black soldiers.35
In a state known for its supposed racial liberality, press coverage of events in Hays City paralleled what Democratic newspapers said about
Southern race relations: armed, aggressive
blacks, protected by a disliked federal military, posed threats to public safety. The
Leavenworth Daily Commercial even likened the
violence to southern "black outrages" provoked
by Radical Republicans. 36 Attitudes became
even more "Confederate sounding" after a
murder by black soldiers in early 1869 led to
one of Kansas' few known racial lynchings.
LEADING TO A LYNCHING

Civilian and military accounts concur that
the events of 5 to 7 January began when Privates Luke Barnes, Lee Watkins, and James
Ponder were refused admission into a local
brothel. Prostitutes, in Hays at least, rarely discriminated on skin color, so more than likely
the men's disruptive behavior prompted the
refusal. All three belonged to the Thirty-
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eighth Infantry, Company E, and at least two,
Watkins and Ponder, had enlisted together in
Nashville and spent detached service away
from the post, protecting railroad camps.37 Later
that evening, the trio invaded the shop of a
black civilian barber named John White. Hiding from the men's rage while they drunkenly
smashed his shop, White heard the troops boast
that they planned to get revenge for the deaths
of their comrades by killing the next white man
they saw. Wandering into the street, the trio
opened fire on a Union Pacific watchman
named J ames Hayes, a ci tizen of Leaven worth.
Shot in the stomach, his spine severed, Hayes
lived until the following morning, describing
his assailants only as "two niggers."38
Evidence against Barnes, Watkins, and Ponder would have been extremely meager without John White's testimony. Accompanied by
the county sheriff and a federal marshal on J anuary 6, White identified the three out of a lineup of the entire garrison, explaining the
vandalism to his shop and their stated intent to
kill a white person. The barber's testimony
placed the post commander, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson N elson, in a precarious position.
Authorities insisted Nelson release the three
to civilian custody rather than placing them
under military protection like Cropper. Besides
the resentment such an action would generate
among his troops, Nelson must have known
about the defendants' tenuous safety in a Hays
jail cell, especially with the vigilance committee in operation. With tensions between
soldiers and civilians running high, Nelson
decided on a conciliatory gesture and permitted county police to assume custody of the privates, who were arraigned later that day before
a justice of the peace and placed under overnight guard.
Luke Barnes, Lee Watkins, and James Ponder never saw their case brought to trial. During the evening of 6-7 January, a mob stormed
the jail, overpowered the guards, and seized
the prisoners from their cells. One account reported the mob's size as between seventy-five
and one hundred, all with masks or darkened
faces. The vigilantes hanged the men from the
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FIG. 4. This railroad trestle over Big Creek is the bridge from which the soldiers from Fort Hays Thirty-eighth
Infantry were lynched in January 1869. Known locally as "Hangman's Bridge," this wooden structure was later
replaced by a steel bridge. Courtesy of Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas.

ties of a railroad bridge half a mile west of
town. Union Pacific employees discovered
their bodies the next morning.
Eastern Kansas newspapers, long contemptuous of Hays City's vigilante tradition, suddenly applauded the lynching. In James Hayes'
hometown of Leavenworth, the Daily Commercial delighted in providing a detailed and hearsay version of the hanging:
Sometime during the night the vigilantes
released the mokes from prison and indulged
them in a dance in mid-air, in which they
executed a treble shuffle, something of a
novelty in negro breakdowns which are
chiefly remarkable for merely a double
shuffle. No doubt existed of the guilt of the

parties, as they sloshed around extensively
brandishing their Springfield rifles, and
threatening vengeance on the whites.
The men and brethren appear to be rather
airy out on the plains, . . . Let us have
peaceP9
The likelihood that Barnes, Watkins, and Ponder would have been convicted and executed
anyway illustrates this incident's strong racist
motives. Hays City's high number of homicides shows remarkable tolerance for violence-except when perpetrated by blacks.
Rather than simply hanging three killers, the
lynching issued a statement that racial norms
concerning troublesome blacks would be enforced illegally if necessary.
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RETALIATION FOR LYNCHING

Unlike other racial lynchings, however, the
January 1869 episode involved United States
soldiers, not usually known for meekness in
the face of violence. Troops of the Thirtyeighth Infantry performed the unpleasant task
of retrieving their comrades' bodies and preparing them for burial. 4o Rather than intimidating soldiers, the lynching only enraged both
the officers and enlisted men. Lieutenant Colonel Nelson, whose disastrous decision had
placed the three within vigilante reach, responded with his own retaliatory measures. On
14 January Nelson se!lt a Thirty-eighth detachment into Hays City to arrest all persons out
after curfew. Black soldiers raided a ballroom
and arrested fifty-one people, jailing them overnight at the fort guardhouse. Nelson later wrote
Governor J ames Harvey that because of the
rumored plots against his men, he intended to
close the saloons and livery stables and even
declare martial law if necessary,41
Such drastic steps became unnecessary as a
short-lived calm ensued following the lynching. In late January, rustlers stole several head
of livestock from the post herd. The troopstheir tempers running high-blamed locals for
the theft. On 6 February Tom Butler, a white
ex-quartermaster's employee who had been
fired on suspicion of stealing, left town following the Union Pacific tracks east. When a
mule was reported missing the next day, officials dispatched a search party which consisted
of the quartermaster and post surgeon, a civilian detective and numerous employees, and
ten soldiers from the Thirty-eighth Infantry.
Tracking and cornering Butler at a water tank,
the group choked him with a rope until he confessed to participation in a rustling gang. The
party then divided, with fort officials and employees in one group and the black troops
escorting Butler in another. Likely recalling
their friends' treatment a month earlier, the
soldiers shot Butler and left his corpse in an
abandoned house. The mule he supposedly
had stolen turned up wandering a few miles
from the fortY
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Clearly an act of revenge, Butler's murder
illustrates the complicity of white military authorities. Tired of incessant attacks on the
army's men and property, white officers willingly sided with black troops in using Butler as
an example, frustrating any designation of the
violence as purely racial. A Hays citizen summarized the situation: "There has been for some
time much unpleasant feeling existing between
the authorities of Hays City and Ft. Hays, commenced by the hanging of the three negro soldiers by the Vig's ... "43 Indeed, the bad blood
between fort and town transcended race, reflecting a larger pattern of antipathy characterizing civilian-military relations. In April,
during the Nineteenth Kansas Cavalry's station at Fort Hays, white troops congregated
nightly in Hays City, engaging in brawls and
shootings with locals. As both the size and number of violent episodes increased, large gangs
of black and white soldiers marched the streets
armed en masse. Meanwhile, fort officials exercised little control over the troops' nightly sojourns. 44
SHOOTOUT AND RAMPAGE

In May 1869 two years of animosity climaxed in an armed confrontation that shared
many features with modern race riots. Newspapers claimed that black soldiers planned to
burn Hays City to the ground, a possibility in
the wake of the lynching. Yet because the
troops had just been paid and drunkenness and
fighting often accompanied receipt of wages,
it appears the violence began with the alcohol. According to admittedly biased civilian
sources, several black infantrymen tried to
break into a brothel from which they earlier
had been refused admission. A scuffle began,
with troops lining up in battle formation and
opening fire into nearby homes and businesses.
Townspeople returned the fire, shooting from
doors and windows and exchanging more than
four hundred shots in about half an hour. 45
At this point, fort officials finally took decisive action, dispatching soldiers from the
Fifth Cavalry to quell the disturbance and or-
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dering all infantrymen back to the post. 46 As
white cavalrymen attempted to break up the
melee, several residents embarked on a rampage against Hays City's few black civilians.
Vigilante ruffians ordered all black families
out of town and murdered two African American barbers. Of the newspapers that reported
the atrocities, only the Kansas Daily Commonwealth voiced contempt for the deed:
Hays City has added another laurel to its
garland of infamy. The other night-after
the affray-a full account of which appeared
in our special dispatches-was ended and
the soldiers had been withdrawn, a party of
roughs deliberately hunted down and murdered two peaceful and unoffending barbers, who were citizens of the town, and as
quiet and harmless men as it afforded. Honest and decent men will want for language
to express their indignation at this brutal
and cowardly outrage.47
Apparently, the two barbers became the only
fatalities during the evening's chaos. The post
surgeon recorded no gunfire injuries but newspapers reported six wounded civilians, including a U.S. Deputy Marshal, and a white trooper
from the Seventh Cavalry.48
While the events of 3 May definitely had
racial motivations, classifying them as a "race
riot" is not quite accurate, occurring as they
did during a period of vigilante activity. In its
coverage of the incident, the Commonwealth
even pointed out that not all the discord derived from blacks' or even the military's proximity:
... it is certain that human life and limbs
are altogether too unsafe in that locality.
Every trifling dispute is settled by an instantaneous appeal to the pistol or the knife.
All things considered, Hays City is one of
the best places to move away from that can
be found upon the globe. 49
Buffalo soldiers proved a contributing but
not determinative factor in the town's history

of conflict. In late April and early May, the
Thirty-eighth companies relocated to new assignments on the Mexican border, leaving Fort
Hays with fewer than a hundred troops by summer of 1869. 50 Even so, the community's reputation for bloodshed continued, with friction
between soldiers and civilians remaining a constant. In 1871, a saloon brawl involving white
troops escalated into gunfire, resulting in the
death of the county sheriff. 51
One should not isolate racial tensions from
their larger social context and exaggerate their
importance over other causes of violence. Yet
the buffalo soldiers' presence did produce longlasting hostility toward the black population.
As the Daily Tribune stated, "Hays City seems
to have many of the same ideas that unreconstructed rebels have, to wit: that negroes have
no rights which a white man is bound to respect."52 Following their eviction in May 1869,
some black families were permitted to return,
a decision most later regretted. In March 1871,
four residents were arraigned for invading the
home of an elderly black woman and raping
her. Whites expressed disgust that the men were
arrested on the word of "colored people." Fearing for their safety, the fort commander permitted all black families to relocate into
dugouts on the post for protection, with troops
once again sent into town to restore order. 53
The 1869 lynching and other such episodes
firmly established the area's reputation as an
unsafe place for African Americans. An observer in 1909 commented on the community's
white homogeneity:
no negro has ever ventured to make Hays a
place of residence. An occasional straggler
has worked a few days in town, but the history of the place has appealed too strongly
to his imagination for him to remain. 54
CONCLUSION

Fort Hays's predominantly black garrison
and its hostile relationship with citizens in Hays
City provides an example of how civilian/military social interaction helped to transfer racial
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hatreds to the newly conquered region. The
years from 1867 to 1869 saw African Americans' introduction to regular army life, the beginning of a twenty-year process in which they
would forcibly help to seize western lands from
American Indians. Prejudice always remained
a factor in their lives but as the Hays City experience indicates, their active involvement
in a local cycle of hatred obscured whatever
achievements whites might have recognized
and intensified racist paranoia.
Whether black soldiers' participation in an
occupying army deserves praise or criticism, of
course, remains a matter of individual perspective and moral judgment, an arena in which
the historian can claim no particular authority. Yet if history teaches any lesson, it is that
one group's pride may be another's tragedy. As
Vernon Bellecourt has asked "Which do we
value more, a wildly bastardized fable of
progress and equality, or truth? Justice is the
act of conscious, informed human beings."55 In
the recent rush to reveal the buffalo soldiers'
past, historians should not forget the dual importance of understanding their legacy, lest new
myths be created similar to those that once
depicted white soldiers like Custer as heroes.
Furthermore, the buffalo soldiers existed not
only as enlistees in the fight against Indians
but as actors in a complex theatre of negotiations framed by civilian whites' racism and the
usual conflicts between army and civilians in
a garrison town. Just as ethnocentric interpretations once regarded black history as insignificant, romanticizing the buffalo soldiers'
experience not only perpetuates distortion, but
it also robs them of the right to be judged not
as representatives of an entire race but as human beings capable of human error.
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